Juvenile Law by Holden, Leta R.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 73 
Issue 3 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 16 
January 2021 
Juvenile Law 
Leta R. Holden 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Leta R. Holden, Juvenile Law, 73 Denv. U. L. Rev. 843 (1996). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
JUVENILE LAW
INTRODUCTION
The juvenile system, only recently established in the United States, has a
dark history in its treatment of delinquent youths.' Until the mid-1960s, juve-
niles had no constitutional rights or protections from the system's abuse.
2
Several major revisions to juvenile law culminated to form a juvenile justice
system nearly rivaling in size and complexity that of the adult criminal sys-
tem.3 In spite of the transformation, the judicial shift from pursuing the "best
interests of the child"4 to proof of criminal guilt continues to stimulate con-
troversy while steering juvenile law in the direction of greater
criminalization.5
In light of the debate surrounding adult sentence enhancement and certifi-
cation issues, this Survey examines two cases that came before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1995. Part I examines the use
of juvenile convictions to enhance adult criminal sentences. In United States v.
1. JUDGE JERRY L. MERSHON, JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE ADJUDICATORY AND DIsPosrnONAL
PROCESS 11 (1991). Other than the New York House of Refuge, established in 1824, there were
very few early juvenile institutions in the United States. Id. While some discussion of the
government's parens patriae existed as early as 1839, the theory that children under a certain age
should be treated differently from adult criminals did not gain acceptance until the first juvenile
code in 1989. Id.
2. Id. at 12.
3. Id. Past juvenile law procedures, which did not guarantee the right to remain silent, the
right to counsel, and other basic rights, were constitutionally suspect. In recent years, the Supreme
Court has corrected most of these deficiencies without destroying the underlying basis of the juve-
nile justice system. Id. As attitudes shift toward making juvenile offenders more accountable for
their actions, the adult and juvenile systems will become even less distinguishable.
4. Entrenched in family law, the "best interests" philosophy remains the predominant custo-
dy standard in most jurisdictions. Best interests philosophy developed by way of parens patriae,
on the theory that when a child's natural parents die, a special court would manage the family es-
tate until the child reached age 21. THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 69
(1992). A fundamental difference, however, exists between the state's role as a parent and the
state's interest in the control and discipline of disruptive youths. Id. A parent may discipline
his/her child by placing limits on the child's behavior. Id. The state, on the other hand, punishes
the child by imposing sanctions such as arrest, detention, prosecution, stigmatization, probation,
and institutionalization. Id.
5. The juvenile justice system first evolved as an attempt to deal with the problems of
dependent, neglected, and delinquent juveniles. Originally, the court's role did not include culpa-
bility determinations or assignments of punishment, but served to protect and help youths in trou-
ble with the law. Id.
Through its evolutionary process, the philosophy has split into several directions in an
attempt to draw the most serious offenders further into the juvenile system and divert the least
serious offenders away from it. The juvenile justice system subscribes to several basic models
when dealing with juvenile offenders. DEAN J. CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 179
(1992). These models guide the different types of decision making made on behalf of or against
specific juvenile offenders. Id. Discussed in context throughout this Survey, these models include:
(1) the rehabilitation model, (2) the treatment or medical model, and (3) the "just desserts" or
justice model. Id. at 179-80. Other models include the noninterventionist, the due process, and the
crime control models. id.
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Alberty,6 the court affirmed the federal district court's legal conclusions re-
garding the application and interpretation of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines. 7 Part II discusses the Tenth Circuit's treatment of certifying juve-
niles for adult criminal prosecution. In Green v. Reynolds,' the court departed
from its traditional interpretation of Rule 9(b),9 which requires the dismissal
of successive habeas corpus petitions, and concluded that denying counsel at a
retroactive adult certification hearing constitutes a deprivation of due pro-
cess. ° After these two decisions, the Tenth Circuit's position on juvenile
rights is now less clear; it is evident, however, that the court has taken a step
backward in awarding the protections of procedural due process to minors."
I. THE USE OF JUVENILE CONVICTIONS TO ENHANCE ADULT CRIMINAL
SENTENCES2
A. Background
The juvenile justice system establishes the means by which state courts
adjudicate youths charged with violations of state laws or ordinances. 3 The
adult criminal system, however, may only sustain sanctions or penalties
against those offenders whom the court officially designates as "adults."' 4 In
that respect, the state must prove cases against adult defendants, who assume
full responsibility for their actions, beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 For non-
6. 40 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1416 (1995).
7. Alberty, 40 F.3d at 1135.
8. 57 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 1995).
9. Rule 9(b) applies to section 2254, or federal habeas corpus petitions. The rule states:
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege
new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if
new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petition to
assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, rule 9(b), 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (1994).
10. Green, 57 F.3d at 958.
11. While the Tenth Circuit's present stance on juvenile rights is evident given the increased
punishment for serious or violent juvenile offenders, its opinion as to the future of the juvenile
justice system remains unclear. In any event, the current system must respond to complaints that
minors, left to the juvenile court's jurisdiction, receive neither the constitutional protections ac-
corded adults nor the rehabilitative treatment postulated for children.
12. 40 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1416 (1995).
13. CHAMPION, supra note 5, at 1-2. State juvenile laws include, within their definitions of
delinquent behavior, all criminal acts, whether violative of local ordinance, state law, or federal
law. Robert E. Shepherd Jr., Trying Juveniles in Federal Court, 9 CRIM. JUST. 45, 45 (1994).
Although most juvenile delinquency proceedings fall within state court jurisdiction, several provi-
sions of the 1994 federal crime bill encourage or even require the federal handling of juveniles
charged with gun or gang related crimes. Id. As a result, state juvenile courts will likely see a
greater number of juvenile cases adjudicated in the federal system. Id. Unless otherwise stated,
this Survey will focus on state court procedures.
14. CHAMPION, supra note 5, at 1-2. Generally, an individual reaches adulthood at age 21.
Yet, the upper limit for many state juvenile courts is 18. The juvenile system resolves this prob-
lem by certifying certain juvenile cases to adult court for criminal prosecution.
15. Whenever a person's freedom becomes jeopardized, "beyond a reasonable doubt" serves
as the appropriate standard of proof in both criminal and juvenile courts. CHAMPION, supra note 5,
at 28. However, in many instances, juvenile courts continue to use the civil "preponderance of the
evidence" standard despite the Supreme Court's ruling in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
[Vol. 73:3
JUVENILE LAW
adults, a separate adjudication process exists for the purpose of deciding culpa-
bility and appropriate treatments. 6 As a result, two separate systems of jus-
tice coexist: adult and juvenile. 7
1. Defining Delinquency
Juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over three major categories of
juvenile behavior. 8 First, the court may intervene in "delinquent offenses"
where the minor allegedly committed an act that the state defines as criminal
for an adult.' 9 Second, the juvenile court reviews "status offenses"2 involv-
ing juvenile behavior that would not be considered criminal if committed by
an adult.2' Finally, the court has exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile cases in-
volving dependency and neglect.22 In these situations, parent-child conflicts
and/or removal decisions merit court intervention simply for the child's protec-
tion.23
Much of the controversy surrounding the juvenile justice system lies in
the status offender classification. 4 This category's very existence illustrates
society's insatiable desire to punish juveniles whenever possible.25  In
CHAMPION, supra note 5, at 28. The Court ruled in that case that the U.S. Constitution entitled
juveniles to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The Court, however, used a due
process rationale rather than the equal protection analysis which would have destroyed all distinc-
tions between juvenile and criminal proceedings. MERSHON, supra note 1, at 27.
16. BARRY KRSBERG & JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE 64 (1993).
Since juveniles are not considered fully responsible for their actions, the antiquated view is that
juveniles do not deserve the same harsh treatment as their adult counterparts. Id. at 65. The logic
of this argument served as the basis for many notions adopted by the early juvenile courts. Id.
Contemporary jurisprudence, however, stresses individual accountability for one's action which
departs from the traditional view of the term "treatment." Consistent with the adult criminal sys-
tem, the juvenile justice system has also responded to the growing trend of "just desserts." CHAM-
PION, supra note 5, at 19.
17. This idea, reflected in court nomenclature, illustrates several outdated principles that
merely add to the complexity and confusion surrounding the juvenile system. For example, an
officer may not arrest a child, but may place him/her in "Protective Custody." MERSHON, supra
note 1, at 12. Similarly, the system does not jail children, but "Detains" them upon the adjudica-
tion of an "offense" rather than imprisonment following the conviction of a crime. Id. The juve-
nile court procedures refer to a "Hearing," not a trial, where a "Disposition" takes place instead of
sentencing. Id.
18. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 64.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 65. This group of juveniles is also referred to as "Persons (or Children, or Juve-
niles, or Minors) in Need of Supervision." MARTIN L. FORST, THE NEW JUVENILE JUSTICE 80
(1995).
21. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 65. This category includes truancy, curfew vio-
lations, and running away. Id.
22. Id. The only behavioral categories that involve the commission of an offense include
delinquency and status offenses. The children in the last category, whose contact with the law in-
volves issues of dependency and neglect, fall within the juvenile court's jurisdiction through un-
controllable circumstances. Their only problem is one of "status," in that these children are either
dependent (without family or support) or neglected (where the family situation is harmful for the
child). CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 30-31 (3d ed. 1991).
23. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 65.
24. Generally, status offending children have the same legal and constitutional rights as the
juvenile delinquent. Judge Leonard P. Edwards, The Juvenile Court and the Role of the Juvenile
Court Judge, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 11 (1992). Under state and federal law, the juvenile court
does not have the same power to detain or incarcerate status offenders. Id. at 12. In practice, how-
ever, most states still permit the detention of status offenders. Id.
25. A considerable part of the status offender debate surrounds the issue regarding the han-
1996]
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response to society's concern for violence by and against youth, the juvenile
system tends to "redefine" status offenders as delinquent offenders-directly
subjecting the child to juvenile court processing.26 For example, the more a
court official believes that a particular youth's "best interests" require institu-
tional placement, the more severe the particular status offense becomes.27
Furthermore, federal policy categorizes probation violations as criminal offens-
es, providing juvenile judges the authority to institutionalize status offenders
directly, even where the original violation constitutes only a mere status of-
fense.2"
In addition to the various behavioral categories, juvenile delinquency
definitions "differ from time to time and place to place" according to several
criteria.29 The term "juvenile offender" may differ depending on the particular
jurisdiction, the scope of the offensive behavior, and the ambiguities sur-
rounding age requirements. ° To add to the complexity, the juvenile system
breaks down the definition of offender status into categories of serious, vio-
lent, and chronic.3 The Federal Bureau of Investigation32 defines a "serious
juvenile offender" as a youth convicted of a Part I offense33 who is at least
age fourteen at the time of the offense.34 Similarly, a "violent offender" is a
dling of children who commit noncriminal acts. While a law enforcement agency would not arrest
an adult for running away from home, receiving an unexcused absence from school, or walking
the streets after dark, these behaviors call for juvenile sanctioning. Considered part of the juvenile
justice system, status offenders undergo a delinquent labeling process similar to society's more
serious juvenile offenders. Without judicial review, juvenile courts may legally institutionalize
youths who have not committed any criminal acts until they reach their twenty-first birthday.
KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 58. In that respect, society fails to distinguish between
juvenile delinquencies such as running away from severe offenses: armed robbery, forcible rape,
aggravated assault, or murder.
26. BERNARD, supra note 4, at 27.
27. Id. Not only does the juvenile receive institutional placement, he now becomes labeled a
"criminal," rather than a status offender. Id.
28. Id. at 28. Under federal policy, a youth charged with a status offense may appear in
court and receive court-ordered probation. Id. As a condition of this probation, the juvenile court
may order the youth not to commit another status offense. Id. Repeat offenders who violate the
conditions of their probation by committing a status offense may then receive criminal institution-
alization. Id.
29. STEVEN M. COX & JOHN J. CONRAD, JUVENILE JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO PRACTICE AND
THEORY 12 (3d ed. 1991).
30. Id. at 12-15. For example, an act might be delinquent in State X, but not State Y or the
law may change in State X, such that an act considered delinquent this year is not delinquent the
following year. Id. at 12. The scope of behaviors is subject to a wide variety of interpretations at
all levels of the juvenile justice system. For example, the terms "incorrigible" or "indecent" con-
duct may appear in delinquency definitions without a standard to guide judges and practitioners.
Id. at 13. Finally, states differ as to the minimum age below which the juvenile court will not hold
a child accountable for illegal acts, or an upper limit where the juvenile court loses jurisdiction.
Id. at 14.
31. NATIONAL COALITION OF STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUPS, MYTHS AND
REALITIES: MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFEND-
ERS, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 27 (1993) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]. Note, however, that these
definitions do not fall along rigid lines as some youths may share the characteristics of more than
one category.
32. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports borrows the juvenile of-
fender definitions from the United States Department of Justice. Id.
33. Included among Part I offenses are murder and non-negligent homicide, forcible rape,
robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Id.
34. Id. at 8.
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youth convicted of a violent Part I offense who has a prior adjudication of
such an offense.35 The violent offender category also includes youths con-
victed of murder alone.36 The third classification, "chronic juvenile offender,"
applies to youths whose records reflect five or more separate charges of delin-
quency, regardless of the gravity of each offense.37
2. Procedural Rights
Juvenile justice philosophy developed from two distinct legal theories: the
doctrine of parens patriae and the rationale of due process.38 The most com-
prehensive landmark juvenile Supreme Court decision to date is In re Gault,39
in which the Court held that juvenile proceedings must measure up to the
standards of due process and fair treatment.4°
The revolutionary Gault decision at last addressed the constitutionality of
the parens patriae doctrine. The Court, however, not only failed to overthrow
the juvenile court system, but also disregarded many other aspects of the pa-
rens patriae doctrine. In an attempt to provide only basic procedural rights for
juveniles,"' the Court formally established the process of "selective incorpora-
tion" of constitutional guarantees on a case-by-case basis.42 Subsequent deci-
sions have broadened the juvenile's due process rights, but the Supreme Court
has failed to grant juveniles constitutional protection equivalent to those grant-
ed to adults.43
35. Id.
36. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention considers a youth a violent
offender if "found guilty of murder alone or of attempted murder, rape or attempted rape, aggra-
vated assault, armed robbery, arson of an occupied dwelling, voluntary manslaughter, or kidnap-
ping, combined with a prior adjudication." Id. at 27.
37. Id. at 8.
38. For a discussion of the parens patriae philosophy, see supra notes 1, 4 and accompa-
nying text.
39. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The treatment of Gerry Gault, arrested at the age of 15 for making
obscene phone calls to a neighbor, illustrates the disparity in treatment between youths and adults.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 4. Gault was taken into custody and detained overnight without notification of
his parents and appeared at a hearing the following day without counsel. Id. at 5-6. At the hearing,
the complaining witness did not appear, the judge did not take any sworn testimony, and the court
made no transcript or formal memorandum of the proceedings. Id. at 5. The trial court convicted
Gault of the charge and sentenced him to a penal institution for six years. Id. at 29. In the same
state and year, an adult would receive a prison sentence of 60 days or less with a maximum fine
of 50 dollars. Id.
40. Id. at 30-31.
41. Instead of demanding exact conformity with adult criminal procedural safeguards, the
Court required only a standard of "fundamental fairness" combined with four specific procedural
protections. These protections include: the right to adequate and timely notice; confrontation of
adverse witnesses; counsel; and the recognition of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at
31-57. Indicating that certain protections become applicable only in confinement cases, the Court
did not address the rights of a juvenile in the pre- or post-adjudicatory stages of the proceeding.
BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE JUVENILE COURTS 19
(1993). Instead, the Court chose to narrowly confine the holding to the actual adjudication of guilt
or innocence. Id. Other matters not decided under Gault include: arrest rights, public or jury trials,
jeopardy, capacity under the insanity defense, grand jury indictment, and appellate review.
MERSHON, supra note 1, at 25.
42. MERSHON, supra note 1, at 24. In reviewing juvenile cases, the Court "selects" which
constitutional rights extend to juveniles and which do not, based upon a seemingly arbitrary deci-
sion-making process.
43. Listed in chronological order showing the evolution of the Court's incorporation doctrine
19961
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3. Sentence Determinations
Another difference between the adult and juvenile justice system concerns
individualized dispositions." The philosophy underlying juvenile justice in-
cludes rehabilitation and individualized justice, thus the juvenile sentence
structure grants judges wide latitude in disposing of juvenile cases.45 Al-
though juvenile delinquency adjudications carry far less serious consequences
today, few sanctions actually reflect the seriousness of the crimes commit-
ted.' Tied to sentence determinations are confidentiality concerns.47 Gener-
ally, states hold juvenile records confidential, forbidding their use in subse-
quent civil or criminal proceedings.' Note, however, that a judge in a subse-
quent criminal case may properly have access to juvenile records paraphrased
in the presentence report.49 In addition, the presentence report itself may be a
key component in guiding the sentencing judge's decision.5" In that respect,
the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance the sentences of adult offenders
has a long lineage." Since juveniles do not have the full array of procedural
rights afforded to adults, critics argue that the use of juvenile adjudications for
regarding juvenile rights, the major cases include the following: Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596
(1948) (protecting juveniles against coerced confessions); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966) (establishing procedural requirements for certification hearings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967) (providing juveniles with rights of notice, counsel, confrontation, cross examination, and
protection against self-incrimination); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (establishing the child's
right, in a delinquency adjudication, to have charges proven beyond a reasonable doubt);
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (refusing to extend the right to a jury trial to
juveniles); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (establishing the child's right against double jeop-
ardy); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (rejecting the claim that pre-trial detention of juve-
niles offended the Due Process Clause); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 460 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that
a diminished Fourth Amendment standard applies to school searches).
44. FORST, supra note 20, at 2.
45. Id.
46. Considered a necessity to the treatment model, the indeterminate sentence has become
the hallmark of the juvenile justice system. Id. When disposing of offenders, one cannot determine
in advance how long it will take for the treatment to become effective. Leslie T. Wilkins, Fore-
word to GERALD R. WHEELER, COUNTER-DETERRENCE: A REPORT ON JUVENILE SENTENCING AND
EFFECTS OF PRISONIZATION xii (1978).
47. In achieving the purpose of rehabilitating troubled juveniles, the juvenile system promis-
es confidentiality to avoid the stigma of an arrest, criminal conviction, or delinquency finding.
DONALD B. KING, 100 INJUSTICES TO THE CHILD 14-15 (1971). The juvenile justice system often
undermines this promise, however, by the sheer number of people who have access to police re-
cords. Id. at 15.
48. MERSHON, supra note 1, at 13. Most state statutes incorporate this principle, and case
law clearly supports this proposition. Id. Exploring the traditional idea of juvenile confidentiality,
Judge Mershon refers to Eugene H. Czajkoski, author of Why Confidentiality in Juvenile Justice?,
which called for the abolishment of confidentiality in juvenile proceedings due to its lack of effect
on the juvenile offender and the disastrous effect on the court's control over serious crimes. Id. at
14.
49. Id. at 14-15.
50. Id.
51. See United States v. Chester, 919 F.2d 896, 898 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reid,
911 F.2d 1456, 1466 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1097 (1991); United States v.
Brown, 903 F.2d 540, 543 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983, 989 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 858 (1990); United States v. White, 888 F.2d 1252, 1254 (8th Cir. 1989).
Other circuits have held that incarceration in a juvenile facility is "imprisonment" for sen-
tencing purposes, and that the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance adult sentences do not
violate due process. See United States v. Davis, 929 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1991). For a review of the
context of other circuit court decisions, see also infra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 73:3
JUVENILE LAW
sentencing purposes amounts to a denial of due process. 2 Like several other
circuits, the Tenth Circuit has accepted the constitutionality of the sentence
enhancement provisions without question. 3
Another procedural issue in juvenile case law addresses whether the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides juveniles a right to a jury in
delinquency proceedings. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,4 the Supreme Court
held that the right to a jury does not extend to juveniles.5 Emphasizing
treatment rather than punishment,56 the Court reasoned that the "juvenile pro-
ceeding has not yet been held to be a 'criminal prosecution' within the mean-
ing and reach of the Sixth Amendment."57 Again, the Court invoked its "se-
lective incorporation" of constitutional principles in reaching this conclusion.
Arguably, the use of less stringent procedures to generate an adjudication in
juvenile court followed by use of that same conviction to enhance a subse-
quent criminal sentences defies logic.5
Overall, the Supreme Court has sent a mixed message concerning the con-
stitutionality of the use of prior convictions.59 If ruled constitutionally invalid,
52. See generally David Dormont, Note, For the Good of the Adult: An Examination of the
Constitutionality of Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences, 75 MINN. L.
REv. 1769 (1991).
53. Few federal courts have addressed the precise question of whether sentence enhancement
provisions violate the Due Process Clause. For example, the Ninth Circuit passed upon this issue
in United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1037 (1990).
The court reasoned that since McKeiver allowed juvenile courts to deprive liberty without benefit
of a jury trial, courts may use the juvenile sentence to later enhance an adult's deprivation of
liberty. Id. at 215.
54. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Two juveniles, aged 15 and 16 (one charged with a felony and the
other charged with a misdemeanor), did not have the benefit of a jury during a delinquency pro-
ceeding. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 534. The state accused the first child, Joseph McKeiver, of rob-
bery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods. Id. Three of the felony charges arose from an incident
in which McKeiver, along with several other youths, chased three younger children and took 25
cents from them. Id. at 536.
In a separate case, the second child, Edward Terry, allegedly hit a police officer with his
fists and a stick, after the officer attempted to break up a fight not involving Terry. Id. After the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied each the right to a jury trial, in the consolidated case the
question eventually appeared before the U.S. Supreme Court, where it joined two North Carolina
cases. Id. at 536-38. The North Carolina cases involved two separate incidents where children
allegedly obstructed traffic and created a disturbance in a principal's office as a result of a march
protesting racial discrimination. Id. at 537.
55. Id. at 545.
56. Id. at 544 n.5. Emphasizing the potential adverse impact that jury trials may have on the
informality, flexibility, and confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings, the Court decided not to
alter juvenile court practices. FELD, supra note 41, at 23.
57. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541. The Court remained unwilling to "remake the juvenile pro-
ceeding into a fully adversary process" and put "an effective end to what has been the idealistic
prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding." Id. at 545.
58. If a juvenile court adjudicates a juvenile offender, the adult criminal court may use that
"conviction" in future prosecutions, even if the individual's rights were compromised (denial of
mandatory advice of counsel and/or the option of a jury trial) as a juvenile.
59. Enhancement provisions call into question two basic premises underlying Supreme Court
decisions. First, if a court uses a juvenile adjudication to enhance an adult sentence, the adjudica-
tion itself becomes "criminalized." Dormont, supra note 52, at 1797. Thus, the rehabilitative goal
of the juvenile justice system is abandoned and the fundamental differences between the adult and
juvenile procedural rights no longer hold true. Id. Second, the length of the juvenile confinement
directly affects the period of adult incarceration. If a minor receives a sentence of confinement for
treatment or warning purposes, the system later penalizes that person as an adult.
19961
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courts may not use convictions against defendants in subsequent proceed-
ings.' The Court refined this principle in Burgett v. Texas,6' holding that
the use of such convictions would essentially deprive a defendant of a consti-
tutional right twice. 62 Nevertheless, the Court continues to permit the use of
prior juvenile adjudications to enhance later sentences.
Despite case law prohibiting the use of prior uncounseled convictions,
federal courts must include prior juvenile adjudications in adult sentence cal-
culations. 63 Federal courts generate their sentencing determinations with
guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission.6' The
heart of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) 65 is a sen-
tencing table, consisting of forty-three base offense levels and six criminal
history categories, identifying the applicable sentencing range for offenders.'
According to the Guidelines, assignments to the highest criminal history cate-
gory, level VI, include those persons classified as career offenders.67 Juvenile
defendants, aged eighteen years at the time of the offense, who commit crimes
of violence or controlled substance offenses, and have at least two similar
prior felony convictions, are classified as career offenders." Furthermore, the
various offense levels may also increase depending on the statutory penalty for
a particular crime.'
60. The Court has held that the denial of constitutional protections will invalidate a convic-
tion in several instances. Id. at 1805 n.32. For example, the denial of a speedy trial invalidated the
defendant's conviction in Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37-38 (1970). In Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968), the denial of a jury trial invalidated the conviction. Id. at 162. Similarly, the
Court held that the denial of the right both to confront and cross-examine accusers, and the right
against self-incrimination invalidated convictions in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) and
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Finally, the Court invalidated a defendant's conviction where
he had been denied of the right to counsel in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 517 (1962).
61. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
62. Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115. The Court concluded that the admissions of constitutionally
infirm convictions result in inherently prejudicial decisions. Id.
63. Shepherd, supra note 13, at 47. "Despite their 'civil' tag, prior juvenile adjudications are
included as part of the 'criminal history' category under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines." Id.
64. Paul M. Winters et al., Project: Twenty-fourth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-1994 Sentencing Guidelines, 83 GEO.
L.J. 1229, 1229 (1995).
65. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4A1.3 (November 1993) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. The Guidelines are applicable to all offenses
committed on or after November 1, 1987. U.S.S.G. Ch.l, Pt.A(l). When a federal court convicts a
defendant, the sentencing judge must impose a sentence based on the Guidelines in effect at
defendant's sentencing date. Id. § lB 1.11, comment.
66. The base offense level constitutes the vertical axis of the Sentencing Table. Id. at Ch.5,
Pt.A. This level focuses on the defendant's conduct during the commission of the convicted of-
fense(s). Darren M. Gelber, Note, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is Discretion Still the Better
Part of Valor?, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 355, 357 (1992). The criminal history category con-
stitutes the horizontal axis of the table. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A. The judge determines the appropriate
category by totaling the number of criminal history points calculated in the pre-sentence report. Id.
§ 4AI.I. The points start at zero and have no upper limit. Id. All defendants with 13 or more
points have a criminal history category of VI, regardless of whether their point total adds up to 14
or 43. Id. at Ch.3, Pt.A.
67. U.S.S.G. § 4131.1.
68. Winters et al., supra note 64, at 1244.
69. Id. at 1230. Adjustment factors include the harm to the victim, the defendant's role in
the offense, the presence of any obstruction of justice, defendant's conviction of multiple offenses,
and whether the defendant accepted personal responsibility for the offense. Id. at 1230-36.
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The Guidelines treat prior sentences, imposed in "related" cases, as one
sentence for purposes of calculating the criminal history category. 0 Prior sen-
tences relate if the sentence results from one of three criteria. The commission
of the crimes must occur either: (1) on the same occasion, (2) as part of a
single common scheme or plan, or (3) or as a result of consolidation for trial
or sentencing.7' Prior sentences do not "relate" if an intervening arrest oc-
curs.72
B. United States v. Alberty
73
1. Facts
Defendant-appellant Anthony Alberty received indictments for unlawful
possession of a firearm as a convicted felon and unlawful possession of am-
munition as a convicted felon.7" Pursuant to a plea agreement, Alberty plead-
ed guilty to the firearm charge in exchange for the government's agreement to
dismiss the ammunition possession.75 Subsequently, the probation officer
classified Alberty as a level VI offender based on thirteen criminal history
points. 6 Alberty maintained that his two prior juvenile offenses were "relat-
ed," and therefore, made him only a level V offender with eleven criminal
70. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. The applicable provisions of the Guidelines read:
(a) Prior Sentences Defined. (1) The term "prior sentences" means any sentence previ-
ously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of no/o
contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense. (2) Prior sentences imposed in
unrelated cases are to be counted separately. Prior sentences imposed in related cases are
to be treated as one sentence for purposes of the criminal history. Use the longest sen-
tence of imprisonment if concurrent sentences were imposed and the aggregate sentence
of imprisonment in the case of consecutive sentences.
(d) Offenses Committed Prior to Age Eighteen. (1) If the defendant was convicted as an
adult and received a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, add 3
points under § 4A1 .l(a) for each such sentence. (2) In any other case, (A) add 2 points
under § 4Al.1(b) for each adult or juvenile sentence to confinement of at least sixty
days if the defendant was released from such confinement within five years of his com-
mencement of the instant offense; (B) add 1 point under § 4A.1.1(c) for each adult or
juvenile sentence imposed within five years of the defendant's commencement of the
instant offense not covered in (A).
Id.
71. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.3).
72. Id.
73. 40 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1416 (1995).
74. Alberty, 40 F.3d at 1132. The felonies were in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and
924(a)(2) respectively.
75. Id. at 1132-33.
76. Id. at 1133. The pre-sentence report assigned Alberty an unadjusted base level of 24. Id.
After receiving a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and an additional one-level
reduction for entering a timely guilty plea, the base dropped to 21. The issue presented on appeal
concerned Alberty's criminal history score of 13. Id. Assessed two criminal points for each prior
juvenile adjudication, Alberty received a total of 13 criminal history points. Id.
The first prior juvenile conviction stemmed from a failure to appear for a hearing relating
to a second-degree burglary charge. Id. Even though the court eventually dismissed the burglary
charge, Alberty received a delinquent adjudication for jumping bail on June 9, 1989. Id. at 1134.
Adjudicated on the same day, the second offense, robbery by force, occurred on a separate occa-
sion. Id. Placed in custody from June 23, 1989 to June 13, 1990, the court ordered the sentences
for bail jumping and robbery to run concurrently. Id.
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history points." In ruling against Alberty's argument, the district court
concluded that the two offenses were separate and unrelated." The court sen-
tenced Alberty to a ninety month term of imprisonment.79
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that
Alberty's two prior juvenile offenses were not "consolidated for sentencing"
under the Guidelines. ° The sole issue before the court concerned the "relat-
edness" of Alberty's two prior juvenile convictions. Relying on the prior sen-
tence criteria in the Guidelines' comment section, the court required Alberty to
prove the existence of some formal order of transfer or consolidation in sup-
port of his claim. However, the Tenth Circuit chose to rely on circuit prece-
dent and ruled that Alberty failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating the
existence of a judicial order.8
The absence of a "factual nexus" between the prior offenses further per-
suaded the court's ruling.82 In the Tenth Circuit precedents requiring no for-
mal order, 3 the court required each of the prior cases to tie together factual-
ly.84 Since the prior cases at issue lacked any factual connection, other than
the fact that the juvenile judge adjudicated both cases on the same day, 5 the
court upheld the district court's assessment of two criminal history points for
each prior juvenile offense. 6
C. Analysis
In Alberty, the Tenth Circuit relied on its precedent in United States v.
Chavez-Palacios,87 which adopted as authority the commentary in the Guide-
77. Id. The greater the defendant's criminal history score, the more severe his sentence. For
example, the sentencing table for a level six offense and a level I criminal history category has a
range of imprisonment of zero to six months. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1772 n.20. If another
defendant commits the same offense, with a criminal history score of VI, he will receive 12 to 18
months imprisonment. Id.
78. Alberty, 40 F.3d at 1133-34.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1135.
81. Id. Specifically, the court relied on: United States v. Gary, 999 F.2d 474 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 259 (1993) and United States v. Villarreal, 960 F.2d 117 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 506 U.S. 856 (1992). These cases, however, "impliedly suggest" the inclusion of a formal
judicial order (but do not necessarily require one) to permit a finding of consolidation. Gary, 999
F.2d at 479-80; Villarreal, 960 F.2d at 119-21.
82. Alberty, 40 F.3d at 1135.
83. See supra note 81 (discussing the Gary and Villarreal decisions).
84. Gary, 999 F.2d at 479-80.
85. Alberty, 40 F.3d at 1134.
86. Id. at 1135. In finding the district court's judgment not clearly erroneous, the Tenth
Circuit cited other circuits where a formal judicial order serves as a prerequisite to a consolidation
finding. Id. at 1135 n.4. In United States v. Russell, 2 F.3d 200 (7th Cir. 1993), the court required
a judicial determination from the sentencing judge to consolidate into a single sentence. Id. at 204.
"Without something in the record.., the district court did not err in finding the offenses unrelat-
ed." Id. The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. McComber, 996 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1993), held
that the section 4AI.2(a)(2) consolidation requirement does not apply where the cases proceeded
to sentencing under separate docket numbers and no formal order exists. Id. at 947.
87. 30 F.3d 1290 (10th Cir. 1994).
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lines, unless it conflicts with federal law."8 Regardless of whether the prior
sentence counts as one related sentence or two separate sentences, sentence
enhancements undermine the important distinction between adult and juvenile
defendants. Sentence enhancement provisions directly conflict with the infor-
mal, nonadversarial setting of the juvenile courts. 9 As part of child
development,"' society expects young people to make mistakes and learn
from their indiscretions without exacting the full extent of adult criminal pen-
alties on juveniles.9' In practice, sentence enhancements illustrate the extreme
difficulties faced by the appellate courts in upholding the developmental ele-
ment of juvenile law.92 In Alberty, the Tenth Circuit misinterpreted the
McKeiver Court's treatment of youths who fall between the two worlds-the
adult and juvenile courts. 93
Unbeknownst to the McKeiver Court, section 4A1.2 of the Guidelines
opened the floodgates for the enhancement of individual sentences based upon
prior juvenile adjudications. 94 As juveniles, these defendants did not receive
the benefit of Sixth Amendment protections;95 yet as adults, they may endure
88. Chavez-Palacios, 30 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913
(1993)). Note, however, that the legislative history of the Guidelines fails to mention Gault,
McKeiver, or provide any logical basis for including juvenile adjudications in the criminal history
scoring. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1785 n.89.
89. SIMONSEN, supra note 22, at ix; see also CHAMPION, supra note 5, at 21 ("Juvenile
courts are civil proceedings designed exclusively for juveniles, whereas criminal courts are pro-
ceedings designed for alleged violators of criminal laws."). This civil-criminal distinction becomes
apparent in several areas: the absence of a criminal record, limited punishments, and extensive
leniency. Formal criminal procedures, relating to the admissibility of evidence or testimony, do
not enjoy the same heightened scrutiny in juvenile proceedings. Id. In addition, hearsay receives
the same consideration as hard information and evidence. Id. at 27.
Another remaining legacy of parens patriae lies in the right to a jury. In recent years, the
Court has consistently rejected attempts to extend the full range of procedural due process guaran-
tees to juveniles. Id. at 173.
90. Research on delinquency suggests that most youths mature out of illegal behaviors or
misdeeds. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 4. Generally considered less mature and respon-
sible than adults, minors often lack experience, perspective and judgment. Shelia L. Sanders, Com-
ment, The Imposition of Capital Punishment on Juvenile Offenders: Drawing the Line, 19 S.U. L.
REV. 141, 153 n.87 (1992).
91. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 5.
92. Id.
93. Similar to other federal courts, the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of § 4AI.2 produces a
result inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1788-89. The
interpretation problem arises when the underlying premises of the juvenile justice system do not
manifest themselves in adult sentencing requirements. Id. at 1790. In McKeiver, the Court made
two key assumptions in justifying a lower standard of due process for juveniles. Id. The first view
relies on the difference between juvenile punishment and treatment. Id. at 1790 n.103. The second
view reflects the belief that juvenile proceedings will not detrimentally affect individuals once
they reach adulthood. Id. at 1790. For a related discussion of the McKeiver decision, see infra
notes 54-62. For a review of the context of other circuit court decisions, see also infra notes 100-
08 and accompanying text.
94. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1805.
95. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal proceedings, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury ... and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have a compulsory process for obtain-
ing witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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additional adult punishment.96 The collateral use of juvenile adjudications
demonstrates the failure of the "fundamental fairness" standard to protect the
very persons the Court meant to protect.9 7 By refusing to address the consti-
tutionality of sentence enhancements," the Tenth Circuit merely postponed
another challenge to juvenile rights.'
D. Other Circuits
Certain types of prior sentences are generally not included in the
defendant's criminal history calculations."'0 Note, however, that the circuit
courts do not always agree as to what constitutes an includable prior sentence.
The First Circuit ruled, in United States v. Unger,"°' that uncounseled juve-
nile proceedings count toward the criminal history scoring.'0 2 In United
States v. Ashburn, °3 the Fifth Circuit held that a juvenile conviction, auto-
matically set aside under a state statute, properly received the prior sentence
designation." In comparison, the Seventh Circuit held, in United States v.
Kozinski,'°5 that a sentence of supervision not based on a finding of guilt re-
ceived improper consideration as a prior sentence.'" However, in Nichols v.
United States, 0 7 the Supreme Court permitted use of a prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction to enhance the sentence for a subsequent conviction
that did not, by itself, justify imprisonment. '°0
96. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1805.
97. Id.
98. The Ninth Circuit was the first appellate court to address the constitutionality of U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.2(d). In United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1037 (1990), the trial court committed the defendant to the California Youth Authority following
his second juvenile bank robbery. Id. at 213. His commitment, however, consisted of an indeter-
minate sentence according to a treatment mandate. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1803. Had the
sentencing judge not included Williams's juvenile sentences in his criminal history scoring, his
sentence would have ranged from 30 to 37 months, not 46 to 57 months. Williams, 891 F.2d at
214. Williams's first bank robbery would have added two points to his criminal history score re-
gardless of whether he had received incarceration in an adult prison, with full constitutional pro-
tection, or in juvenile hall with limited protections. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1804.
99. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1805.
100. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c). According to the Guidelines, sentences for offenses such as hitch-
hiking, juvenile status offenses and truancy, loitering, minor traffic infractions, public intoxication,
and vagrancy do not count towards the criminal history scoring. Id. To work around these con-
straints, "the Guidelines place no cap on the number of points an adult may acquire from his
juvenile record." Dormont, supra note 52, at 1774.
101. 915 F.2d 759 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1104 (1991).
102. Unger, 915 F.2d at 761-62. Unger allegedly engaged in a variety of criminal conduct as
a juvenile, including breaking and entering, receiving stolen goods, and assault and battery. Id. at
763. In failing to prove this conduct, the state could not convict Unger of these offenses, but
instead found him "guilty" of being "wayward." Two years later, an adult court judge used this
wayward finding to increase his criminal history score, imposing the maximum sentence. Id. at
760.
103. 20 F.3d 1336 (5th Cir.), opinion reinstated in part on reh'g en banc, 38 F.3d 804
(1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 1969 (1995).
104. Ashburn, 20 F.3d at 1343.
105. 16 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 1994).
106. Kozinski, 16 F.3d at 812.
107. 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
108. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928.
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II. CERTIFYING JUVENILES FOR ADULT CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS"0
A. Background
Another issue in juvenile justice concerns the adequacy of "transfer"
proceedings. Transfers, also known as waivers or certifications, refer to the
transfer or jurisdictional shift of certain cases from juvenile courts to adult
criminal courts" ° for purposes of adult prosecution and punishment."' Few
jurisdictions provide an intermediate juvenile-adult category for sentencing
serious young offenders. As a result, juveniles indicted for certain serious
crimes may either be tried in juvenile court with inadequate procedures, or in
adult court, with standard adult sentences."2 Juveniles tried in juvenile courts
do not have a right to a jury trial and may receive longer sentences than
young adult offenders convicted for the same offense in criminal court."' On
the other hand, juveniles transferred out of the juvenile justice system are
subject to the full range of adult punishments, including life imprisonment and
the death penalty." 4
The landmark case concerning waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction is Kent
v. United States."5 Regarded as the first major juvenile rights case, Kent ad-
dressed the issue of whether a juvenile should receive less protection than that
awarded to adults suspected of criminal offenses." 6 Kent established that: (1)
109. 57 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 1995).
110. Hon. Vida J. Taliaferro, Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 REs GEsTAE 38
(1995).
111. CHAMPION, supra note 5, at 212. Intake officers generally refer the more serious cases to
juvenile prosecutors with a recommendation that the children receive a jurisdictional transfer, for
their safety, as well as the safety of others. Id. at 178. Once granted, the jurisdictional waiver
redefines and classifies the defendants as adults for prosecution in criminal courts. Id. at 212.
112. Juvenile judges have limited options when dealing with those offenders who commit
particularly serious violent or capital offenses. Id. at 228. Generally, prolonged incarceration in a
juvenile facility serves as the most powerful sanction available to these judges. Id. As a result,
officials consider waiver or certification actions the desired method of obtaining more severe pun-
ishments for juvenile offenders. Id.
113. Due to their wide discretion in handling juveniles, juvenile courts have the power to
administer lengthy sentences of detention. Id. Unfortunately, this discretion applies to status of-
fenders as well as to serious or dangerous juvenile offenders. Id. Despite the few unfavorable
implications of juvenile court adjudications, however, many juveniles prefer not to contest or fight
their transfers to criminal courts.
114. Generally, life imprisonment and the death penalty lie beyond the powers of the juvenile
court judge. Id. Age, however, no longer remains a mitigating factor as the U.S. Supreme Court
has upheld death sentences for two offenders who committed criminal offenses at age 16 and 17
in the consolidated cases of Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri. Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361 (1989). See generally Sanders, supra note 90, at 141 (discussing the death penalty
and juvenile defendants).
115. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). The state arrested Morris Kent, then age 16, on charges of house-
breaking, robbery, and rape, as he was serving probation for housebreaking and attempted purse
snatching. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543. After repeated interrogations, the juvenile court detained Kent
for one week at the receiving home for children, without the benefit of an arraignment or probable
cause hearing. Id. at 544-45. During the detention, the police interrogated Kent without the benefit
of his counsel or parents. Id. at 551. Kent's attorney filed a motion for a hearing on whether to
waive jurisdiction. Id. at 545. The judge waived jurisdiction without ruling on the motion and
without a waiver hearing. Id. at 546.
116. Id. at 551.
19961
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juvenile courts must conduct waiver hearings before transferring juveniles to
the jurisdiction of adult criminal court; 7 and (2) juveniles have the right to
counsel before and during such hearings." ' After summarizing the differenc-
es between adult courts and juvenile delinquency proceedings,' the Court
laid out several determinative factors to guide waiver judicial decision-mak-
ing.'
2 0
B. Green v. Reynolds'
2'
1. Facts
The Oklahoma district court convicted and sentenced Rickke Green when
he was sixteen years old.22 After filing the first of three federal habeas peti-
tions, Green pursued a state post-conviction claim asserting that his adult
prosecution violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.'2 3 At the time of the convictions, the applicable Oklahoma statute al-
lowed the adjudication of females, eighteen years old and younger, in juvenile
court'24 while subjecting juvenile males, sixteen to eighteen years old, to
adult prosecution without providing a transfer hearing.
Pursuant to the remedy announced by the Tenth Circuit in Bromley v.
Crisp,'25 the state granted Green a retroactive adult certification hearing
117. Id. at 561.
118. Id.
119. These differences include:
[The juvenile] may be confined, but with rare exceptions he may not be jailed along
with adults. He may be detained, but only until he is 21 years of age. The court is ad-
monished by the [D.C. juvenile] statute to give preference to retaining the child in the
custody of his parents "unless his welfare and the safety and protection of the public
cannot be adequately safeguarded .. " The child is protected against consequences of
adult conviction such as the loss of civil rights, the use of adjudication against him in
subsequent proceedings, and disqualification for public employment.
Id. at 556-57 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-907, -915, -927, -929 (1961)).
120. The Kent factors address issues such as the seriousness of the alleged offense, the so-
phistication and maturity of the juvenile, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. For a complete list-
ing of the Kent factors, see id. at 566-67.
121. 57 F.3d 956 (1995).
122. Green, 57 F.3d at 957. Green faced over 55 years of incarceration for grand larceny,
possession of and robbery with a firearm after former conviction of a felony (AFCF), and con-
cealment of stolen property AFCF. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 958.
125. 561 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). This case established
the proper procedures for determining whether a defendant's conviction survived a challenge un-
der Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972). Under Oklahoma juvenile code provisions, the
state could prosecute males under age 16 as adults, while females of the same age remained sub-
ject to the juvenile court's jurisdiction, unless certified to stand trial as adults. OKLA. STAT. tit. X,
§ 1101(a) (Supp. 1969). The Lamb court held that the sex-based statute violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Lamb, 456 F.2d at 20. The court later held that the Lamb decision applied retroactive-
ly. Radcliff v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 939 (1975).
Citing Kent, the Bromley court held that it need not set aside convictions if the juvenile
court can establish that the adult certification would have taken place had it conducted an ade-
quate hearing. Bromley, 561 F.2d at 1356-57 (citing Kent, 383 U.S. at 564-65). To make such
determinations, the court requires that a state or federal court conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id.
at 1357 n.6. The burden of proof, however, rests with the state to take into account all doubts and
any weakness of proof due to the passage of time. Id.
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(RAC hearing) to determine whether a transfer would have even taken place
had the court followed the proper procedures in 1971.126 After denying
Green's request for assistance of appointed counsel, Green refused to partici-
pate in the hearing claiming insufficient time to prepare. 2 7 Upon hearing the
state's evidence at the RAC hearing, the court concluded that Green's transfer
would have occurred had the district court conducted a proper hearing in
1971.28 The district court concluded that each of the seven grounds for re-
lief 9 referred to in the habeas petition related to the 1971 convictions. "'
The district court ruled that defendant's grounds "could have been, or were,




The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision as to six of the
seven grounds-finding relief unavailable due to their omission from the first
habeas petition in 1977.113 The last ground for relief survived dismissal as
the Tenth Circuit further ruled that the state's denial of Green's request for
counsel at the RAC hearing deprived him of due process.'34 The Tenth Cir-
cuit reasoned that the claim contained neither successive nor abusive elements,
and, therefore, required a constitutional review on the merits due to the inap-
plicability of Rule 9(b). 3 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit remanded in part,
reversed in part,'36 and instructed the lower court to issue a conditional writ
vacating the pertinent convictions unless the state conducted an RAC hearing,
complete with representation."'
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Green v. Reynolds follows a long line of
cases protecting the rights of juveniles. 3 To comply with the Supreme
Court's ruling in Kent, a transfer hearing "must measure up to the essentials of
due process and fair treatment." '39 Generally, a habeas petition requires
126. Green, 57 F.3d at 957.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 957-58.
129. Defendant's grounds included: (1) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (2) that
the Court of Criminal Appeals acted to deprive him of effective assistance of appellate counsel. Id.
Other grounds included one claim that the court subjected him to an unconstitutional appellate
delay and one claim that the convictions were unconstitutional under Lamb. Id.
130. Id. at 957.
131. Id. at 958.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 957.
134. Id. at 961.
135. Id. at 958.
136. Id. at 961.
137. Id.
138. For a brief description of the major juvenile rights cases, see supra note 43.
139. Kent, 383 U.S. at 562. Relevant provisions include representation by counsel; the
juvenile's meaningful access to pertinent information considered by the juvenile court; and an
adequate statement of reasons for the juvenile court's decision. Id. at 561-63.
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Rule 9(b) dismissal if the petition "successfully" repeats a claim previously
determined on the merits, or the petition "abusively" asserts new grounds
unjustifiably omitted from a prior petition.'" The "unique" factual twist pre-
sented in Green, however, required a somewhat different analysis of Rule
9(b). 4" As the only logical alternative, the Tenth Circuit regarded the Lamb
violation (gender-discrimination) and the denial of counsel as substantively
separate claims. Had the Tenth Circuit deemed the RAC hearing a post-con-
viction proceeding, the district court could deny counsel, thus repeating the
same due process violation. 42
The principal purpose of a jurisdictional waiver is to decide whether the
juvenile should receive criminal prosecution in adult court or be subject to the
rehabilitation of the juvenile courts.'43 Transfer procedures represent a type
of community vengeance toward juveniles.' Too frequently, however, the
use of transfers serves merely as a convenient tool for shifting jurisdiction
over certain juveniles to adult courts.'45 The system arbitrarily renders some
juveniles "death eligible" simply because a particular judge subjectively deems
the juvenile "mature."'" If the separation of juveniles from hardened adult
criminals serves as a crucial component of juvenile rehabilitation, then trans-
fers to adult facilities deprive youths of an opportunity for rehabilitation."
This loss also subjects juveniles to cruelty and abuse by other inmates."
The current standard of appellate review of waiver decisions 49 and the
consequences of reversal should remain separate and independent issues.
Every decision to transfer a child to criminal court should automatically create
140. Green, 57 F.3d at 958 n.3 (citing Watkins v. Champion, 39 F.3d 273, 275 (10th Cir.
1994)).
141. Id. at 958.
142. Id. at 961. As a post-conviction hearing, the only available remedy would be to institute
another uncounseled hearing on adult certification. Id. For an explanation of the Lamb decision
and Lamb violations, see supra note 125.
143. KING, supra note 47, at 70. According to the founders of the juvenile justice system, all
children capable of rehabilitation should receive a trial through the juvenile court procedures rath-
er than the criminal law system. Id.
144. Id. at 68.
145. Twenty years ago, most certification cases occurred as a result of a some type of sensa-
tional delinquency or criminal act that attracted public attention. Id. As a result, the child was
unjustly "thrown to the lions" to satisfy the community's sense of vengeance. Today, many chil-
dren receive the same fate simply due to society's abhorrence for youth violence. Id.
146. Glenn M. Bieler, Note, Death Be Not Proud: A Note on Juvenile Capital Punishment, 7
N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 179, 201 (1990).
147. KING, supra note 47, at 85-86.
148. Id. It is not uncommon for younger boys to be exposed to various sexual assaults by
other inmates. Id. Adult facilities may also become an undesirable school yard where juveniles
leam even more sophisticated methods of criminal activity from adults. Id. One study observed
that juveniles held in adult jails have a suicide rate nearly five times that of juveniles housed in
juvenile facilities. Sarah Freitas, Extending the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to the Juvenile
Waiver Hearing, 62 U. CHIi. L. REV. 301, 309 (1995). In addition, it is likely that a juvenile de-
tainee, without a prior record may share a cell with a hardened and dangerous adult offender. Id.
149. Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in American Juvenile Justice: In
Defense of Discretionary Waiver, 5 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 267, 278 (1991).
Generally, a defendant must demonstrate that the trial court abused its "sound discretion." Id. In
Green, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. Green, 57 F.3d at 957.
150. Zimring, supra note 149, at 278.
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a right of appeal. 5 ' As demonstrated by Green, a number of difficult issues
surround the standard of review and the appropriate remedy, especially if the
alleged behavior does not warrant the transfer.'52 If the Tenth Circuit had
held the district court's waiver decision inappropriate, Green's age, at the time
of the appeal, would have pushed him far beyond the reach and setting of the
juvenile court.' The consequences of reversal directly influenced the Tenth
Circuit's unwillingness to intervene and correct an abusive result. The court
did nothing but "pass the buck" back to the lower court, without addressing
the prejudicial effects of the entire waiver process. If the court truly recog-
nized the philosophy of "best interests," it would have to remand with instruc-
tions to impose juvenile sanctions.'54
D. Other Circuits
Transfer issues represent a complex area of juvenile law with many statu-
tory schemes. As it stands today, appellate courts reviewing the constitutional-
ity of state laws have found variance in their due process provisions. For ex-
ample, in Russell v. Parratt, the Eight Circuit found no denial of due process
in proceeding against a juvenile as an adult without an evidentiary hearing."'
In addition, the Ninth Circuit, in Guam v. Kinsbury,'56 held that due process
does not require a social investigation as a condition precedent to certification.
CONCLUSION
The juvenile courts in this country have an important mission regarding
their place within the criminal justice system. Since juveniles do not have the
full range of procedural protection under the law, the systematic violation of
juvenile rights becomes inevitable. At one extreme, a great tragedy would
result if the judicial system abolished all rehabilitative goals envisioned for
151. Id. at 277. Zimring proposes a system that provides "waived" defendants the option to
appeal the waiver determination before trial or after the conviction in criminal court. Id.
152. Id.
153. Prosecuted at the age of 16 as an adult, Green received a sentence of incarceration for
over 55 years. Green, 57 F.3d at 957. Having served some 24 years in an adult penitentiary, the
only available recourse is to reduce Green's sentence. Zimring, supra note 149, at 278. Had defen-
dant received a juvenile delinquency proceeding in 1971, state law would have mandated Green's
release from detention by his nineteenth birthday. Green, 57 F.3d at 961 n.8. Although a reduction
in sentence does not restore the defendant to juvenile status, it does prevent the state court from
conducting a retroactive adult certification (RAC) hearing in its favor.
154. Contrary to precedent established by Kelley v. Kaiser, 992 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1993),
the Green court remanded the case to state court to conduct a constitutionally adequate RAC
hearing. Green, 57 F.3d at 960. Similar to Green, Kelley had also suffered a Lamb injustice. How-
ever, the Kelley court ruled that the state already had the opportunity to address the certification
issue and had resolved the question without providing the defendant with a full and fair hearing.
Kelley, 992 F.2d at 1516. The court then held that proper procedures required the district court to
address the issue. Id. While no proof exists as to which court, state or federal, provides the better
forum, the Green decision provides the trial judge an opportunity to search for new reasons to
certify the juvenile. If a trial judge denied jurisdiction over the juvenile once, it is highly unlikely
that judge would fairly reconsider the issue on remand.
155. 543 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1976).
156. 649 F.2d 740 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
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youthful offenders and treated all juveniles as adults. At the other extreme, the
system will continue to hold delinquents criminally responsible for their mis-
behavior without the added benefit of certain privileges and immunities intend-
ed for juveniles. In sum, the juvenile justice system lacks a coherent and con-
sistent policy on how to deal with juveniles. American society must decide
whether it wants to punish, protect, or treat its wayward youth. Only then may
the judicial system clear the muddle surrounding juvenile justice. Until that
time, the lack of response serves only to help offenders generate future crimes.
Leta R. Holden
